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3. 
“There is More of it in Vietnam” 
 The Role of the Media in an Asymmetric Conflict 
 
Gloria BÄR 
 
Introduction 
“There was more of it in Vietnam” 
This phrase used by American soldiers is descriptive of the 
terror and the overkill of the Vietnam War. There was more 
firepower and there were more civil casualties than in 
previous military conflicts as there were 7 million tons of 
bombs dropped until 1975 and according to estimations, 
roughly 627,000 civilians lost their lives during the conflict.1 
However, these are not the only superlatives perceived during 
this conflict as it is considered the first war with unlimited 
media coverage. Thus, this war was referred to as “the 
television war”, “the uncensored war”, and the first “living-
room war”. 2  Despite the substance of these attributes, the 
medial impact on the Vietnam War is unalterable, especially 
because of innovations, such as the medium TV, which 
provided the contingency to project the horror of Vietnam in 
every living room around the world. 
The role of the media in the Vietnam War has been 
discussed on various levels, which is why the state of research 
focuses on many different details. Those works that offer the 
                                               
1 Bernd Greiner, Krieg ohne Fronten. Die USA in Vietnam (Hamburg: 
Hamburger Ed., 22007), 41-43; Marc Frey, “Das Scheitern des ‘begrenzten 
Krieges’: Vietnamkrieg und Indochinakonflikt,”  Studies in Contemporary 
History 2 (2005), 17, accessed September 4, 2015, 
http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/1-2005/id=4476. 
2 Michael Mandelbaum, “Vietnam: The Television War,” Daedalus 111 (4) 
(1982): 157-169, accessed September 10, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 20024822; Daniel C. Hallin, The “Uncensored 
War”: The Media and Vietnam (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1989); Michael Arlen, Living-room War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1997).  
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best overview on the media coverage are Wölfl’s 
Kriegsberichterstattung im Vietnamkrieg from 2005 and Hallin’s The 
‘Uncensored War’ (1989), and Wyatt’s Paper Soldiers (1995), 
focusing on the American press and how it was influenced by 
the government’s information policy.3 Furthermore, there is 
Phillip Knightley’s The First Casualty (2004), which emphasizes 
on the American war correspondent and its role in the 
Vietnam War. Peter Braestrup’s Big Story (1994) offers the 
most detailed information on the Tet coverage, by interpreting 
and depicting the reporting of the American press. His work 
is of major importance since he was in Vietnam as a 
correspondent for the Washington Post and thus, has the ability 
to describe many situations in more detail. To portray the 
Vietnamese media difficulties emerged since the research on 
this subject seems to have occurred either during the war or 
shortly afterwards. The most important works to mention are 
Häggman’s Propaganda und psychologische Kriegsführung der 
Kommunisten in Vietnam während des Krieges (1975), Ngo-Anh’s 
Vietcong (1981) as well as Pike’s Vietkong (1968), which found 
consensus about the functions and goals of the Vietcong’s 
media coverage.4 The most remarkable works on the Vietnam 
War movie are Dittmar’s and Michaud’s From Hanoi to 
                                               
3 Jan Wölfl, Kriegsberichterstattung im Vietnamkrieg, Krieg der Medien - 
Medien im Krieg 2 (Münster: Lit. Verlag, 2005); Hallin, The “Uncensored 
War”; Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam 
War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
4 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and 
Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2004); Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television 
reported and interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1986 in Vietnam and Washington 
(Novato: Presidio, 1994); Bertil Häggman, “Propaganda und 
psychologische Kriegsführung der Kommunisten in Vietnam während des 
Krieges,” Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung 3 (1975), 69-97; Cuong Ngo-Anh, Der 
Vietcong: Anatomie einer Streitmacht im Guerillakrieg (München: Bernard & 
Graefe, 1981); Douglas Pike, Vietkong: Organisation und Technik des 
revolutionären Befreiungskampfes (München: Oldenbourg, 1968). 
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Hollywood (1990) and O’Nan’s Vietnam Reader (1998). 5  The 
newest research does not show a certain trend, however, it 
does include discussion about the asymmetry in the Vietnam 
War. As an example Bernd Greiner’s Krieg ohne Fronten (2007) 
and Frey’s Scheitern des ‘begrenzten Krieges’ (2005) are to mention, 
both analyzing the conflict in Vietnam within the context of 
the asymmetric warfare debate. On the background of the role 
of the media in the Vietnam War Paul Gerhard published two 
articles, “Die aufscheinende Apokalypse des Krieges in 
Vietnam und der Vietnam Film als Verarbeitungsform des 
amerikanischen Traumas” (2006), concerning the Vietnam 
movie as a medium to process the events during the conflict, 
and “Living-Room War” (2009), portraying the importance of 
the medium TV. Yen Le Espiritu’s essay on “The ‘We-Win-
Even-When-We-Lose’ Syndrome” deals similarly with a 
subsequent view of how the American press handles the loss 
in Vietnam. Finally, Jacqueline Phinney’s “And that’s the way 
it is: The media’s role in ending the Vietnam War” (2011) 
briefly summarizes the impact of the media coverage on the 
conflict in Indochina.6 
                                               
5 Linda Dittmar and Michaud Gene, ed., From Hanoi to Hollywood: The 
Vietnam War in American Film (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1990); Stewart O’Nan, ed., The Vietnam Reader: The Definitive Collection of 
American Fiction and Nonfiction on the War (New York: Anchor Books, 1998). 
6 Greiner, Krieg ohne Fronten; Frey, “Das Scheitern des ‘begrenzten 
Krieges’”; Gerhard Paul, “Die aufscheinende Apokalypse des Krieges in 
Vietnam und der Vietnam Film als Verarbeitungsform des amerikanischen 
Traumas,” In Medien und Krieg – verhindern, dulden oder rechtfertigen? Beiträge 
zur Militärgeschichte und Militärpolitik 8, ed. Lothar Schröter and Frank 
Schubert (Schkeuditz: Schkeuditzer Buchverlag, 2006), 91-102; Gerhard 
Paul², “‘Living-room war’: Vom exklusiven Seherlebnis zum ersten 
Fernsehkrieg der Geschichte,” In Bilderschlachten: 2000 Jahre Nachrichten aus 
dem Krieg. Technik –Medien – Kunst, ed. Hermann Nöring, et al. (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009): 342-49; Yen Le Espiritu, “The ‘We-
Win-Even-When-We-Lose’ Syndrome: U.S. Press Coverage of the 
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the ‘fall of Saigon’,” American Quarterly 58 (2) 
(2006), 329-52, accessed August 29, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40068366; Jacqueline Phinney, “And that’s 
the way it is: The media’s role in ending the Vietnam War,” Dalhousie 
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It is apparent that the current state of research mostly solely 
describes the American point of view, due to factors of 
accessibility and language; it logically provides a wider scope 
for investigation. Consequently, a unilateral perception of the 
media’s impact on the Vietnam War is provided, which 
forecloses a farsightedness on the issue. In order to determine 
the role of the media in the Vietnam War, both the influence 
of the American and the Vietnamese side will be investigated 
and discussed until the end of Johnson’s presidency. The 
intention behind this approach is to specify, whether the 
media played a role in ending this conflict, or just contributed 
to forming opinions on a war which just could not be won. 
Therefore, the medial asymmetry, meaning the imbalance 
which was produced by the coverage, will be portrayed and 
analyzed.  
Hereinafter, the basis of investigation will be 
established by providing an overview of the most important 
media used during the Vietnam War. The range includes 
various forms of mass media, such as the print media, radio 
and the “new” medium TV. Afterwards, the asymmetry of 
media coverage will be reflected upon, particularly concerning 
the negative public perception, which was impelled after the 
Tet Offensive in 1968 and the conclusions drawn from this 
perception. Then, the American perception, more precisely 
Hollywood’s perception of this asymmetric conflict will be 
depicted by analyzing and comparing four major Vietnam War 
movies produced in different periods of reappraisal. 
Representative for the first wave of major movies are Michael 
Cimino’s The Deer Hunter (1978) and Francis Ford Coppola’s 
Apocalypse Now (1979), whereas Platoon (1986) directed by 
Oliver Stone and Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987) are 
exemplary for the second one. Thus, the re-processing of 
                                                                                              
Journal of Interdisciplinary Management 7 (Spring 2011): 1-15, accessed August 
21, 2015, http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/ handle/10222/ 13827/ 
Phinney%20-%20And%20That%20s%20the%20 
Way%20It%20Is.pdf?sequence=. 
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America’s lost war will be set forth on the basis of this probe, 
especially regarding how the Americans and their opponents 
are portrayed.  
 
Media Coverage of the Vietnam War 
As already indicated media coverage during the Vietnam War 
plays an essential role in the history of war reporting and is 
influenced by several factors. A censorship by the U.S. 
government was never officially imposed, since the armed 
conflict arose out of a situation, in which the Americans were 
initially sent to South Vietnam to provide assistance. This 
aspect also entailed a relatively late interest in the American 
engagement in Vietnam.7 Hence, the extraordinary novelty of 
this war was the ability for the press to report nigh on freely 
about the events that took place. 8  Furthermore, both the 
American and North Vietnamese press were driven by diverse 
convictions due to the discrepancy of their purpose. Adding 
to that, the opponent sides differ in quantity, quality, and 
partiality. The prominence of these aspects will be exemplified 
in the further, right after the spectrum of media utilized in this 
confrontation has been examined. Media focused on in the 
following ranges from the radio, the print media to the new 
medium TV, and film productions. First of all, the coverage 
of the Vietnam War in the U.S. did not remain on a consistent 
level throughout the conflict; therefore, an overall impression 
of the media used is given. Moreover, one has to distinguish 
between the “independent” media, meaning not directly 
controlled by the U.S. government, and the media used by the 
military to support their propaganda campaigns. Thus, the 
addressees for this media coverage are military service 
members and their families, the American and the world 
public. The major news agencies present in Vietnam were AP, 
                                               
7 William M. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 2. 
8 Kristina Isabel Schwarte, Embedded Journalists: Kriegsberichterstattung im 
Wandel (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2007), 13. 
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UPI, Reuters and the Agence France Press (AFP), which 
researched for a vast amount of newspapers and TV as well as 
radio stations. Each of them had representatives in Vietnam, 
although there was only a small press corps on-site at the 
outset of American intervention.9  U.S. radio and television in 
Vietnam were represented by six reporters for the NBC and 
CBS – both had around 15.000.000 viewers –, and four for the 
ABC (ca. 1.580.00 viewers). Since the amount of television 
sets rose to 100 million devices during the Vietnam War, 
NBC, CBS, and ABC broadcasted 184 hours on the events in 
Vietnam between 1965 and 1970.10 The major newspapers on-
site which reported about the war were the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times, joined by the 
journals Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report. 
Furthermore to mention are the Minneapolis Papers, the Scripps-
Howard Group, the Chicago Daily News, the Wall Street Journal, the 
New York Daily News, the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Star, the 
Detroit News, the Christian Science Monitor and Newsday, each 
represented by one reporter. 11  However, many newspapers 
abstained from sending their own correspondent to Vietnam 
and consequently had to rely on information delivered by the 
government or other news agencies and reporters. Since it 
functions as a source of information for the soldiers in 
Vietnam the military media the AFVN (Armed Forces Vietnam 
Network) has to be mentioned as well. The network comprises 
radio stations and TV stations to directly report to the active 
duty service members overseas. 12  The Stars and Stripes 
newspaper accounted for the press media, a newspaper which 
had its beginnings during the American Civil War.13 
                                               
9 Hammond, Reporting Vietnam, 1-2. 
10 Gerhard Paul, “‘Living-room war’,” 345. 
11 Wölfl, Kriegsberichterstattung im Vietnamkrieg, 81. 
12 Randall J. Moody, “The Armed Forces Broadcast News System: 
Vietnam Version,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 47(1) (1970): 
28, accessed September 9, 2015, doi: 10.1177/1077699070 04700104. 
13 Stars and Stripes, “About Stars and Stripes,” published December 7, 2015, 
http://www.stripes.com/ customer-service/about-us. 
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In contrast to the American press, which is except for the 
military media not directly controlled by the government, the 
media are utilized by the Vietcong functions as a projection 
surface of their ideas. Hence, what is presented in the 
following has to be assigned to the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) and their Liberation Press Agency, which was founded in 
February of 1961.14 Consequently, the media are embedded in 
the propaganda organization of the Vietcong, which was 
introduced to address three different parties: the population 
and soldiers of the “liberated areas” and North Vietnam, the 
population and soldiers of South Vietnam and the world 
public. Therefore, several newspapers were solely published 
for the locals in Vietnamese. The most important newspaper 
was Nhan Dan (The People), because it functions as the voice 
for the Lao Dong Party. In addition, Hanoi released the Quen 
Doi Nhan Dhan (The People’s Army) and Thoi Noi (The New 
Time). Other significant papers are Cuu Quoc (National 
Rescue), the oldest North Vietnamese newspaper, and Lao 
Dong (The Laborer).15 Additionally, the NLF issued journals 
for the international audience, to justify and advocate their 
revolution. The most prominent ones are the quarterly issued 
journal Vietnamese Studies, with an English and a French issue. 
Whereas the monthly journal Viet-Nam, released in English, 
French, Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese, deals with political 
and cultural subjects, the Viet-Nam Youth, as implied by the 
name directly addressed a younger audience. The most 
significant propaganda journal for the North Vietnamese was 
the Viet-Nam Courier; it was issued every two weeks in both 
English and French.  
 Due to the fact that the new medium TV was in the 
ascendant the application was still costly and time-consuming, 
for that reason it was hardly used by the North Vietnamese to 
present their opinion. To compensate this issue, radio 
coverage had a vital role. Radio Hanoi or the “Voice of 
                                               
14 Ngo-Anh, Der Vietcong, 105. 
15 Häggman, “Propaganda und psychologische Kriegsführung,” 75. 
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Vietnam” aimed at the people of Vietnam as well as the 
American soldiers and the global public. Even though the 
radio started as a clandestine station at the end of the 1950s, 
its importance grew over the following years. 16  Eleven 
shortwave and three medium wave transmitters sent the 
NLF’s broadcasts throughout the world, while using nine 
different languages and 150 hours of broadcasting time.17 The 
English broadcast included a show directly geared to the 
American soldiers, Hanoi Hannah, which played 30 minutes 
every day..18 With her paroles she tried to break the morale of 
the opposing soldiers: 
American GIs don’t fight this unjust immoral and illegal war 
of Johnson’s. Get out of Vietnam now and alive. This is the 
voice of Vietnam Broadcasting from Hanoi, capitol of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Our program for 
American GIs can be heard at 1630 hours. (Hanoi Hannah, 
12 August 1967)19 
Moreover, the North Vietnamese also produced 
several movies, mostly documentaries, supporting the 
propaganda for foreign countries. Up until 1963 already 91 
movies were produced and the number grew steadily.20 
After listing the media both opponents employed, it is 
inevitable to examine how the asymmetry between these two 
parties emerged. Through differences in motivation, firepower 
and troop structure, the Vietnam conflict itself showed signs 
of asymmetry; this imbalance is portrayed by the media in 
different ways. In order to present the discrepancies evolved, 
the press coverage on the Tet Offensive serves as an example. 
                                               
16 Willi A. Boelcke, Die Macht des Radios: Weltpolitik und Auslandsrundfunk 
1924-1976 (Darmstadt: Ullstein Verlag, 1977), 548. 
17 Häggman, “Propaganda und psychologische Kriegsführung,” 76. 
18 Ngo-Anh, Der Vietcong, 166. 
19 Don North, “The Search for Hanoi Hannah,” Viet Nam Generation 
Inc. 1991, accessed September 30, 2015, 
http://www.psywarrior.com/hannah.html. 
20 Häggman, “Propaganda und psychologische Kriegsführung,” 77. 
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The media coverage during the Vietnam War, especially the 
American attitude towards it, changes significantly during the 
conflict, because the political background changed as well. For 
instance, since the war lasted for a comparatively long time, 
the media were influenced by three different administrations. 
Due to the fact that there has not been an official declaration 
of war, the American government did not have a reason to 
justify a censorship on the media coverage. This, however, 
does not imply that the correspondents had the ability to do 
as they pleased. They had to confer with their editors − and 
even more importantly had to make sure not to offend the 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), led by 
General William Westmoreland (1914 – 2005), as they had to 
be approved by them. 21  The process to receive this 
accreditation was fairly easy. As soon as the correspondents 
obtained a visa they had to submit a letter to the MACV, in 
which the newspaper states to take “full responsibilities for 
[their] professional actions, including financial responsibility 
and personal conduct as they affect [their] professional 
action”.22 Free-lancers had to deliver two letters of different 
organizations, in order to proof the coverage of costs. After 
managing these steps the correspondents received an 
accreditation card, which stated that 
[t]he bearer of this card should be accorded full co-
operation and assistance … to assure the successful 
completion of his mission. Bearer is authorized rations and 
quarters on a reimbursable basis. Upon presentation of this 
card, the bearer is entitled to air, water and ground 
transportation under a priority of 3.23 
Since the constraints on the media coverage were 
minor, due to the reasons already mentioned, it could be 
expected that the American correspondents in Vietnam used 
                                               
21 Wölfl, Kriegsberichterstattung im Vietnamkrieg, 82. 
22 Wyatt, Paper Soldiers, 142. 
23 “MACV,” 1966, Office of Information, Correspondent Accreditation 
Files, boxes 15-22, RG 334-74-593, Adjutant General’s Office, 
Department of the Army, Washington National Records Center. 
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this opportunity to report as freely and truthfully as possible 
about the events in Vietnam. The only presses impaired by 
censorship were the newspaper Stars and Stripes and the Armed 
Forces Vietnam Network, which primarily addressed the 
troops.24 Thus, the press had to sign a commitment to respect 
a few rules concerning the release of information, whether it is 
classified or not. 25  For instance, the press cannot publish 
“future plans, operations, or strikes …, exact number and type 
or identification of casualties suffered by friendly units,… [or] 
tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of 
attack”.26 
On the contrary, the North Vietnamese did not need 
any sort of accreditation out of several reasons. First of all, 
their media were domestic and controlled by the NLF, 
consequently there were no freelance reporters or 
correspondents sent by foreign press agencies, who needed to 
be accredited. Furthermore, the NLF put emphasis on being 
considered as a member of the world diplomacy, therefore, 
they sent representatives to international meetings to act in 
place of both South and North Vietnam. 27  In 1970, the 
Vietnam Courier stated that the NLF maintained diplomatic 
relations with 25 countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, 
Cuba, and Iraq.28 Thereby, they consider themselves superior 
to the South Vietnamese government and did not have to 
follow any of the set regulations. Consequently, they did not 
have to give account of which information they are releasing, 
or the substance of this information. For instance, casualties, 
                                               
24 Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretative History of the Mass 
Media (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 547. 
25 Wyatt, Paper Soldiers, 159-160. 
26 “Memorandum for Correspondents: Rules Governing Public Release of 
Military Information in Vietnam,” October 31, 1966, Disaccreditation File, 
MACV Office for Information, box 14, RG 334-74-593, Adjutant 
General’s Office, Department of the Army, Washington National Records 
Center. 
27 Pike, Vietkong: Organisation und Technik des revolutionären Befreiungskampfes, 
214. 
28 Häggman, “Propaganda und psychologische Kriegsführung,” 95. 
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troop movement, and battle outcomes are no longer classified 
information, but details that can be used to the disfavor of 
their opponent. As a result, the Vietcong were able to regulate 
information in order to represent a picture of the Vietnam 
War that was favorable for them. Moreover, since the NLF’s 
press was already on-site, indigenous, and stronger connected 
to the Vietnamese people, they had an advantage over the 
American correspondents, who had to find ways to receive 
credible and presentable information. Resulting, the NLF has 
a tactical asset over the U.S., because they had the entire 
surveillance and control of their media. This aspect will be 
further illustrated in the media coverage of the Tet Offensive 
in the following. 
Despite the possibility for a relatively open coverage 
throughout the war, the American media did not take the 
opportunity to report as freely as they could have and as soon 
as they should have. Engaged with the cold war and 
influenced by Kennedy’s information policy, most American 
media forfeited the chance to provide a seamless coverage on 
the Vietnam War. Those correspondents who did try to 
deliver a continuous and reliable report were challenged with 
restricted, wrong or propagandistic information.29 Relating to 
this subject, Hallin applies the concept of objective journalism, 
which generally describes a form of coverage that lives of the 
facts that are presented and that the journalist abstains from 
subjectivity, personal opinion or judgement.30 However, the 
American media has the best requisite to not remain objective 
in political affairs, as it is independent of the government’s 
influence. Freedom of press is not only rooted in the 
constitution, but also provided since most media agency is 
owned by private persons.31 As already stated, the American 
press during the Vietnam War did not take up the full extent 
of their abilities to transport a critical coverage of this military 
                                               
29 Schwarte, Embedded Journalists, 15. 
30 Hallin, The “Uncensored War,” 68. 
31 Ibid., 64. 
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conflict. Superficially, a divergence from the objective 
journalism can be portrayed during the Vietnam War, but 
investigating this aspect on a deeper scale it becomes apparent 
that the media rather abstained from forming an actual 
opposition. 32  On the one hand, John F. Kennedy (1917 – 
1963), one of the most favored presidents, knew how to use 
the media in his favor and thus, understood to pull the strings 
in the background. His speech in front of the American 
Newspaper Publisher’s Association promoted a silent 
solidarity or secrecy from the journalist, in order to stand 
united against a common enemy: 
The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open 
society; and we are as a people inherently and historically 
opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths and to secret 
proceedings. We decided long ago that the dangers of 
excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts 
far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it … 
But I do ask every publisher, every editor, and every 
newsman in the nation to reexamine his own standards, and 
to recognize the nature of our country’s peril. In time of 
war, the government and the press have customarily joined 
in an effort, based largely on self-discipline, to prevent 
unauthorized disclosures to the enemy. In time of “clear 
and present danger,” the courts have held that even the 
privileged rights of the First Amendment must yield to the 
public’s need for national security.33  
After the speech, it seems that the American press was 
divided into two fractions. Those loyal to the government and 
the press corps on-site in Vietnam, who perceived what was 
going on and noticed that the American involvement slowly 
                                               
32 Daniel C. Hallin², “The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political 
Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media,” The Journal of 
Politics 46 (1) 1984). 11, accessed August 8, 2015, doi: 10.2307/2130432. 
33 Kennedy, John F: “Address ‘The President and the Press’ Before the 
American Newspaper Publisher Association, New York City,” April 27, 
1961. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
accessed September 28, 2015, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8093. 
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but steadily turned into a war. 34  With the change of 
government, a change of the attitude towards the media was 
inevitable, especially since the conflict escalated incessantly 
under Lyndon B. Johnson. The new President, who hoped to 
pursue with the same information policy his predecessor used, 
was not successful with this attempt. Instead of cooperating 
with the media, he tried to deliver them false information to 
influence them towards his opinion. Consequently, an increase 
of the credibility gap, meaning the loss of plausibility, was 
unavoidable.35 By trying to direct which information should be 
released they tried to use the correspondents in Vietnam as a 
means to an end.36With the increasing proliferation of the war 
while Lyndon B. Johnson (1908 – 1973) was president, the 
media presence in Vietnam grew from a small corps of 
correspondent, reaching its peak in 1968 with 464 accredited 
correspondents in Vietnam, although it has to be taken into 
account that only 60 of them were considered “fact-finding” 
and actually delivered information to an American audience.37 
Contrary to the U.S., the North Vietnamese did not 
have to face these difficulties, since their information policy 
has mostly remained the same throughout the Vietnam War 
and because this policy was formed for a special purpose. 
With their excessive propaganda attempt, they directly 
addressed the countries abroad in order to receive support for 
their revolution, reduce the empathy towards South Vietnam, 
and to impair the perception of the U.S. involvement in 
                                               
34 Wölfl, Kriegsberichterstattung im Vietnamkrieg, 58. 
35 Ibid., 77-78. 
36 Knightley, The First Casualty, 411.  
37 “Press List: Correspondents accredited by the U.S. Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam, April 1, 196,” Big Story: How the American Press and 
Television reported and interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1986 in Vietnam and 
Washington, Vol.2 ed. Peter Braestrup (Colorado: Westview, 1977), 245-54; 
Braestrup, Big Story, 10; Steve Hallock, The press march to war: Newspapers set 
the stage for military intervention in Post-World War II America, Mediating 
American History 10 (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 103-104. 
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Vietnam. 38  The importance of the propaganda campaign 
abroad was stressed in an article in Nhan Dan: “The more our 
just struggle wins the support of the people of the world, the 
better able we will be to demand the implementation of the 
Geneva Accords, including the most important clause, on 
reunification.” 39  Thus, following their set idea of media 
coverage and foreign diplomacy the North Vietnamese were 
not in the unfavorable situation that they had to adjust to 
current political events, just like the American press had to. 
Even beyond that, it was easier for the North Vietnamese to 
manipulate the media to reach their goals as they are not 
under public pressure, such as the Americans who had to 
uphold the impression of a fair, democratic, and just nation.  
The coverage of the Tet Offensive introduces a mood 
swing in the American media coverage and more importantly, 
it changes the public opinion of the war in Vietnam. This 
event shows asymmetry in many factors. First of all, the battle 
itself, as it was a surprise attack by the Vietcong who used the 
ceasefire over Tet, the celebration of the lunar New Year to 
attack their enemies. 40  Furthermore, the overall asymmetry 
was determined by troop numbers, firepower, and motivation. 
With its launch in the night of January 31, 1968 a long fight 
between the Vietcong on one side and the South Vietnamese 
supported by the Americans on the other side broke out.41 
The Tet Offensive was considered “a ‘last gasp,’ a failed all or 
nothing bid to win the Vietnam War on the ground, which, 
tough stymied in the field, succeeded, largely by accident, in 
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persuading America to throw away the fruits of a major allied 
victory and start down the road to defeat and humiliation.”42 
The portrayal of Tet in the media, however, showed a 
different reception, because de-facto a victory for the 
Americans and South Vietnamese the offensive showed that 
the two allies are not superior to the Vietcong like the 
American media and the president lead to believe. This can be 
directly depicted by looking at the reactions on the Tet 
Offensive in the news. 
To begin with the peculiarities of the Tet Offensive 
have to be stated, since the conditions the American 
correspondents had to face, had an impact on the immediate 
coverage of this battle. Although, the number of accredited 
correspondents was the highest in 1968, there were not 
enough researching reporters to cover the surprise attack. 
Consequently, stories on the alleged occupation of the U.S. 
embassy in Saigon prevailed during the early reports of the 
Tet Offensive, as “(1) it was American, (2) it was close at 
hand, and (3) it was dramatic.”43 In addition to the lack of 
personnel to cover the events, other difficulties restricted the 
possibility of an exact and sudden coverage. Logistically the 
American press corps was too unstable in order to cope with 
the circumstances the attack exerted. The communication 
system disintegrated due to an overload of the phone system, 
which made it difficult for the correspondents to 
communicate, to receive, and to confirm information. It was 
not only hard to exchange news within Vietnam, but also to 
deliver new stories abroad, due to the outage of air traffic on 
the outset of the offensive, and the dependence of some news 
organizations on a dissatisfying wire. Taking all of these 
factors into account, it becomes obvious that the competing 
journalists put emphasis on exceling each other to issue new 
reports. Furthermore, it has to be stated that “[t]he Tet 
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Offensive was the war in microcosm – superior American 
firepower against superior North Vietnamese political will.” 
Thus, the weeks during the Tet Offensive also mirrored the 
relationship the American press had with the U.S. government 
since the conflict started, and especially under President 
Johnson.44  
Now, it is time to take a closer look on the newspaper 
coverage of the Tet Offensive. Through the above described 
haste, the reporters were rushed to issue a story on the attack, 
therefore, the first American reports of the offensive showed 
a distorted image of the actual events. For instance, the fight 
at the U.S. embassy was presented more dramatically, because 
AP as well as UPI simply did not have or use the time to 
verify the information by the military police that also did not 
exactly see the fight happening. Since the newspaper reporter 
in Saigon knew, that the U.S. will soon be informed through 
the wire services, they felt compelled to make a move. 
Consequently, most stories were written in a great haste, with 
sparse information, and published before an official report on 
the events was released.45 On the outset of the Tet Offensive, 
a group of 19 Vietcong attacked the U.S. Embassy in Saigon 
that was poorly guarded. By bombing it – the wall was holed – 
the Vietcong were able to attack the front of the building, and 
tried to invade. Six hours later, the fight in the compound was 
over and the Vietcong were dead.46 The American newspapers 
reported about the event in Vietnam: 
The New York Times’ headline on January 30th was 
more than an overemphasis of the events: “Vietcong Attack 7 
Cities; Allies Call Off Tet Truce.” Tom Buckley, who wrote 
the article presented the information rather vaguely as he 
reported that “Vietcong raiders drove into the center of seven 
major Vietnamese cities … burning Government buildings, 
freeing prisoners from provincial jails and blasting military 
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installations and airfields with rockets and mortars.”47 In the 
Late City edition of the New York Times on January 31st, the 
attack on the U.S. embassy in Saigon was thematized, 
however, it remained unclear whether the Vietcong invaded 
the building or just attacked it. Charles Mohr wrote that 
“[m]any details of the embassy battle were unclear for the 
time being, even though newsmen ran crouching with military 
policemen when the grounds were retaken.” This statement 
comprises both problems of the coverage on the attack of the 
embassy. The information provided was uncertain, which 
consequently lead to wondering whether the embassy really 
had to be “retaken.” Under Buckley’s headline “Foe invades 
U.S. Saigon embassy raiders wiped out after 6 hours Vietcong 
widen attack on cities,” he presented the fight involving the 
embassy. He also indicates that “[e]leven hours later, only 
fragmentary reports could be obtained of many of the 
guerrillas’ assaults that turned Saigon, a relatively secure island 
in a widening sea of war for the past two-and-a-half years, into 
a battleground.” Therefore, the New York Times reporters 
truthfully admitted that the information provided is doubtful 
and ambiguous − an aspect neglected by many wire services.48  
The Washington Post’s first story on the occurrences in 
Vietnam was a rewrite from the wire services titled: “Vietcong 
seize part of U.S. embassy – Building retaken in fight.” It was 
maintained that “[p]arts of the building had been held by the 
enemy for six hours … [including] part of the first floor of the 
building itself.” The first reworked edition had the same title 
but conceded that not the building but the embassy complex 
was seized. The last edition completed at two o’clock in the 
morning Eastern Time declared under the title “Vietcong 
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invade U.S. embassy – assault crushed by GIs” that the “fight 
raged in the garden of the embassy compound.”49  
However, it is remarkable that both the Times and the 
Post managed to cover the attack on the embassy more 
precisely than most wire services, although they were slowed 
down by various factors. Striking about both reports is that 
Westmoreland’s interview was not taken into account, even 
though CBS News aired it on January 31st as a special report. 
The newspapers coincided on most accounts, such as the 
dilatoriness of the troops in Saigon, but showed a discrepancy 
concerning the severity of the attack in Da Nang, or the 
substance of the information delivered.50  
This story prevailed on TV, in the press, and the wire 
services, because “[t]he ‘terrorist-proof’ embassy was 
‘symbolic’ …, the battle was dramatic (Colonel Jacobsen was 
good copy), and, most important, the newsmen were around 
to watch the action (or part of it).” Not to forget, the story 
was spectacular and thus, sold well, an aspect which cannot be 
neglected when talking about the press. Although they 
function as a medium of information, newspapers also have 
their focus on the finances, which influences the nature of 
media coverage. Considering this aspect, the reports of both 
the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune have a far more 
patriotic tone, than perceived in the Post and the Times. 
Moreover, a Cold War mentality can be observed by looking 
at their headlines. The L.A. Times wrote on January 30th, 1968: 
“Reds open up. Da Nang, 7 capitals attacked. Allies cancel 
cease-fire as communists start offensive.” 51  The Chicago 
Tribune asserts: “Recapture U.S. Embassy. GIs land in 
copters on Saigon roof, wipe out Viet Cong in 6-hour battle. 
Reds blast hole in wall to gain entry.” 52  Not only the 
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terminology is distinctively different from that of the other 
reports in the Times and the Post, but also the tone the 
reporters used. The accounts are not geared towards a neutral 
and informative coverage, but show a rather sensationalist 
approach. Both articles talk about communist attacks that 
were “wiped out” by American GIs. On top of it, the L.A. 
Times provide a picture which shows a marine with the caption 
“beleaguered Khe Sanh – A lone U.S. marine, center, [and] 
stands atop sandbags that protect huts at Khe Sanh.”53 Thus, 
the Tet Offensive and the fight at the embassy are presented 
in a very drastic way, as a devious attack on the American and 
South Vietnamese. The fact that the Vietnam War, and 
especially the U.S. involvement in this conflict degenerated a 
while ago seems of no importance. 
Naturally, the military newspaper Stars and Stripes, 
which directly wrote for the American GIs, reported the 
events in a different manner. According to their report on 
February 1st “Viet Cong forces launched heavy attacks against 
Saigon” and that “Guerillas fought their way into the U.S. 
Embassy and occupied five floors of it for several hours.” 
This aspect has already been proven to be false, since the 
Vietcong were not able to invade the building. Moreover, it is 
stated that “Helicopters dropped troops onto a roof-top pad 
to help rout the Communist suicide squad.”54 In contrast to 
this, Braestrup describes the same event as follows: “One by 
one, the sappers died in the yard. After sunrise, MPs rushed 
the gate, ending the fight, just as a platoon of airborne troops 
landed by helicopter on the chancery roof to ensure the 
embassy’s security.”55 Thus, the attack on the embassy was not 
presented as the six hour battle on the compound that it was, 
but as a fierce fight, during which the Vietcong invaded the 
building and had to be chased out by American troops. Two 
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days later, the headline of the newspaper reports: “Red Death 
Toll for 3 days: 10,553.” The matching article proffers that the 
Vietcong were not able to upscale their impact, which 
therefore implies, that the Tet Offensive proved to be a failure 
for Hanoi.56 
Since the asymmetry of the coverage shall be 
presented, it is now striking to reflect the NLF’s press 
coverage on the Tet Offensive. The Vietnam Courier, the 
weekly published newspaper, directly addresses foreign 
countries and is therefore the best example to portray the 
desired perception of the offensive outside of Vietnam. Five 
days after the launch of the attack, the newspaper offered a 
positive summary of its alleged result by delivering the 
headline: “The whole of South Viet Nam in effervescence.” 
Thus, the major successes are that “[i]n 3 days, Saigon, Da 
Nang, Hue, 60 other urban centers and more than 20 U.S. and 
puppet bases [were] attacked,” which led to “successive 
uprisings of the urban and rural populations” and to the fact 
that “[t]he People’s Forces control many cities and towns 
including Hue, Nha Trang, Da Lat, Ben Tre and Saigon main 
wards.” 57  In their next issue, these achievements were 
numbered, stating that “50,000 Enemies, including 10,000 
Yankees, killed, wounded or captured” and “200,000 Soldiers 
of [the] puppet army routed.”58 It is needless to say that those 
results are utopian, since the Americans and the South 
Vietnamese technically sustained fewer casualties. Hammond 
and Swearingen, however, referred to the reason why the 
NLF’s information policy still had an influence on the notion 
of the Tet Offensive: “North Vietnam pursues its course with 
a rigidly austere determination born of confidence in its 
excellent political organization, in the fighting qualities of its 
army, and in the ‘immutable’ laws of history and of 
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revolutionary war, buoyed by hope that disunity and 
frustration in the United States will undermine the American 
effort.” 59  Moreover, the NLF’s diplomatic groundwork laid 
the basis for a successful completion of the offensive, since it 
did not only weaken the South Vietnamese government but 
also guaranteed that both Saigon and the U.S. troops were not 
primed for the attack.60 
Concluding, what does the snapshot of the Tet 
coverage comprise and effect and moreover, how do these 
findings compare to the actual outcome of the offensive? The 
Vietcong’s charge on South Vietnam and the Americans and 
the consequent press coverage on the events contributed to a 
sustainable change on the perception of the war throughout 
the U.S. and the world. Therefore, a change of mood towards 
the war was inevitable, which especially derived from the 
inability of the U.S. government to generate a euphoric 
sentiment about the involvement in Vietnam. One reason for 
this development is the new medium TV and the inexperience 
with its effects. Considering that from 1965 until 1970 out of 
2,300 reports only 76 actual showed combat operations, and 
thus the depiction of the American soldiers were rather heroic 
and Hollywood-like, it is not surprising that the coverage of 
the Tet Offensive lead to a confusion in the USA. Hanoi’s 
attack clearly showed the shocking reality of the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, that it was indeed a war. 61 
Consequently, the Vietcong’s charge is remembered as the 
starting point of battered morale among the American citizens 
and it does reveal the importance of the media. According to 
David Halberstam, “[i]t was the first time in history a war had 
been declared over by an anchorman,” hinting at significance 
of Cronkite’s report on the events in Vietnam. Although, the 
offensive is portrayed as a “disastrous turn of events,” the 
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influence on America’s public opinion is more intricate and 
not as sweeping.62 One can rather assess the attack’s aftermath 
as the inception for the already formed opposition to raise 
their voice. Lastly, whether the Tet Offensive was a victory or 
a loss for the U.S. was not the most important issue, because 
regardless of the result the war was simply not under control. 
Moreover, the palm they bore was a pyrrhic victory, the price 
they paid for the involvement in Vietnam was simply too 
high.63 
In a secret North Vietnam politburo cable the effects 
the Vietcong wanted and did achieve with their information 
policy are clearly named:  
As a result of our massive victories in all areas, military, 
political, and diplomatic, especially the victories we won in 
the general offensive and uprisings during the Tet Lunar 
New Year, the situation on the battlefield in South Vietnam 
and the situation in the U.S. and throughout the world is 
developing in directions that are very favorable to us and 
very unfavorable for the enemy. Because of major political, 
social, and economic problems, because of the ferocious 
struggles going on within American leadership circles, 
especially during the primary elections in the U.S., and 
because of powerful pressure from world public opinion 
and from U.S. public opinion, Johnson has been forced to 
“restrict the bombing” of North Vietnam.64 
With the severity of the Tet Offensive being an unpleased 
surprise, both the press coverage and the prevalent political 
and military shortcomings lead to an establishment of an Anti-
war movement in the USA. Although, the media alone cannot 
be faulted for the rejection of Johnson’s policy, it had a large 
share by contributing to the widening of the credibility gap. 
                                               
62 Hallin, The “Uncensored War,” 168. 
63 Ibid., 170-173. 
64 “Secret North Vietnam Politburo Cable,” April 03, 1968, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Party Central 
Committee, Hanoi. Translated for CWIHP by Merle Pribbenow, accessed 
September 30, 2015, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113977. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:19:15 |
63 
 
Therefore, public opinion resulted to be the “essential 
domino” which eventuated in the downfall of the Johnson 
administration and ultimately the loss of support for the 
Vietnam War itself.65 
 
From Vietnam to Hollywood 
In the following part of the chapter, the perception of the 
Vietnam War in the American cinema will be discussed by 
looking at four highly representative war films: The Deer 
Hunter, Apocalypse Now, Platoon and Full Metal Jacket. Movies 
and war have a strong and complex connection. Therefore, 
movies function as a medial sounding board, and with 
analyzing them, one cannot only gain insight on the actuality 
of an historic event, but also receive an impression of the 
political and temporal context the movie is embedded in.66 
The genre these movies are assigned to had its beginnings in 
1915 with the release of the Birth of a Nation, a movie which 
unifies themes and motifs that are still copied and reused 
today, such as marching armies, horrifying pictures of 
casualties, and the creation of an heroic protagonist. 67  By 
adding All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) as an example of 
the subsequent movies, it becomes apparent that war films 
can either depict a pro- or an anti-war position, or 
alternatively both at the same time. This movie delivers a 
highly pacifistic message to the audience, since it revolves 
around the futility of the positional warfare in the First World 
War. The images depicted neither reflect a pride to serve for 
one’s country, nor are they glorious or heroic. In the course of 
time the genre developed steadily towards a vehicle to mirror 
criticism, as well as approval of past or present political 
events. In contrast to the Second World War in which the 
Americans functioned as the “savior” of Europe, contributing 
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tremendously to defeat the Nazi regime, the public perception 
of the American intervention in Vietnam was rather negative. 
As Michael Ryan and Douglas Keller remarked, “Hollywood 
military movies of the seventies and eighties need to be read, 
first, in the context of the ‘post-Vietnam syndrome,’ which 
was characterized by the desire of withdrawal from ‘foreign 
involvement’ after the debacle in Vietnam and epitomized by 
the Clark Amendment forbidding intervention in Angola.”68 
Thus, by scrutinizing the movies in the following it can be 
ascertained whether Hollywood remained with this trend or 
whether a more critical approach is used in order to depict the 
public American opinion and the digestion of this doubtful 
operation. 
Even though the audiovisual media improved throughout the 
Vietnam War, it is remarkable that Hollywood completely 
discounted productions on this subject until 1973 when The 
Green Berets was released. However, this movie did not contain 
any sort of criticism it solely vindicates the U.S. intervention. 
Therefore, the overall impression is that “[t]he American 
soldiers are tough, gutsy, and heroic, the South Vietnamese 
incompetents and victims, the Communists vicious, good only 
for cannon fodder.”69 It seems that this theme prevailed and 
that Hollywood did not dare to release a movie which 
criticizes it directly as it still lasted. The Deer Hunter and 
Apocalypse Now both show a rather heroic depiction of the 
American troops in combat and contrasting an evil and 
vicious one of the Vietcong as the stereotypic enemy. Despite 
of this portrayal, the horror of Vietnam prevails as a constant 
companion. 
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The Deer Hunter emerged as the first movie which was directly 
related to the Vietnam War, although the production of 
Apocalypse Now had already started before. With its tripartite 
structure, Cimino’s work shows the journey of a group of 
three friends who leave from their hometown Clairton in 
Pennsylvania to fight in the Vietnam War and their struggle 
after ending their duty there. Michael (Robert de Niro), Nick 
(Christopher Walkin), and Steven (John Savage) and their 
community are of Eastern European origin, which is 
especially striking considering the cold war background of the 
intervention in Vietnam. Nevertheless, those three − and 
above all Michael − represent the stereotypic American 
soldier. By dividing the story into three parts, the audience has 
the possibility to perceive the direct effect of the war on a 
small group who already had their problems before joining the 
military. The other movies presented do not share this back-
story although they involve a collective as well. Their 
members were foregathered not by friendship but through the 
brotherhood of the military. Instead of just showing a glance 
of the community’s life, the events are described very detailed, 
such as Steven’s wedding and the deer hunt the group 
undertakes.70 The sudden transition from Clairton to Vietnam 
appears to be as rapidly and dramatically as the rupture the 
soldiers must have experienced as they found themselves 
fighting in the war: napalm, flamethrowers, and death set the 
tone of the first images of the war and the impression persists 
as the three friends, who recently reunited, are held captive by 
the Vietcong. The following scenes expose the most horrific 
moments of this movie, since it does not concentrate on the 
guerilla war and overwhelming American firepower, but on 
the personal drama of this group. The Vietcong force their 
prisoners to play Russian roulette against each other, once 
again a portrayal of the malicious enemy, who is entertained 
by their ailing captives. Nick accomplishes to liberate the 
friends, thereupon the group is separated, and each member is 
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left to his own fate. Consequently, The Deer Hunter shows the 
long term impact on veterans by exemplifying it on Michael, 
who survived the war without any visible injuries, but still 
struggles to integrate into his old community, Nick, who 
suffered from PTSD, remained in Vietnam and continued to 
risk his life playing Russian roulette, and at last Steven, who 
lost his legs in the war and was not willing to return to his 
wife. In contrast to the other movies, Cimino’s work mainly 
concentrates on the emotional effect of the war rather than 
the military importance, an aspect also shared by Apocalypse 
Now discussed in the following.  
Therefore, it appears that Vietnam merely functions as 
a mirror which reflects more serious obscurities than just 
political ones. “The veteran protagonist struggles to interpret 
and understand what Vietnam has come to represent, 
struggles to interpret its mystery, and America perhaps more 
than Vietnam is the landscape against which the cost of his 
failure of interpretation indelibly etched.”71 The particularity 
about The Deer Hunter is especially the representation of the 
veteran’s strain. As Michael returns to his home town without 
knowing what happened to his friends, he is not even willing 
to go to his own homecoming party. The only person he 
opens up to is Linda (Meryl Streep), Nick’s girlfriend, who he 
already fancied before they left to go to Vietnam. Through 
talking to her, he finds out that Nick went AWOL.72 As Linda 
asks him about his wounds, he replies: “It was nothin’. Just 
the usual complications,”73 and he tries to cover the fact that 
the war also left marks on him. This aspect is stressed later on 
when he states: “Linda, I just want to say how sorry I am 
about Nick. And how, I know how much you loved him and 
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… I know that it’ll never be the same.”74 Not only does this 
show the impact Vietnam had on the soldiers, but also the 
mental overload that the families at home had to deal with. 
This is most of all noticeable looking at Steven’s family. He 
returned from the war as an amputee, so he decides to stay in 
a veteran’s hospital, leaving his depressed wife in town 
because he thought he does not fit in anymore. 
Not only the family relations change, but also the 
dynamics within the group of friends. For instance, the deer 
hunt the group participates in takes on more drastic traits, as 
the group reunites for this activity, after Michael comes home. 
What is striking is that Michael, who beforehand was the best 
shooter of the group, is now not able to shoot the deer having 
lived through the horror of Vietnam. The situation escalates 
when Stan (John Cazale) points his gun at the friends, 
whereupon Michael, who remembers the Russian roulette 
tragedy during their captivity, loses his mind. He empties the 
cylinder except for one round, spins it before engaging it, 
holds the gun to Stan’s temple and pulls the trigger. However, 
not only Michael suffers from this condition. Nick, who does 
not even return to the U.S., is driven into madness and is 
found playing Russian roulette in the jungle of Vietnam, while 
Saigon is falling. The tragic end of this movie was Nick’s 
death during the game of Russian roulette, he was challenged 
to by Michael in order to convince him to come back home.  
Finally, can The Deer Hunter be evaluated as a prowar 
or an anti-war movie? Cimino’s film combines both positions 
to some extent. As shown, the movie clearly criticizes the 
handling of the veteran situation, the psychological strain and 
horror of war. Moreover, to be representative for a prowar 
movie, the depiction of the war is not significant enough, 
since combat situations are reduced to a minimum. As the 
movie was released, it was considered as pro-war and idealistic 
for the American hero who returns home after successfully 
saving his friends’ life. In fact, Cimino’s criticism is more 
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profound, above all looking at the home the three friends are 
supposed to return to. The pathetic picture of the American 
home front that is determined by alcoholism, violence 
towards women, broken relationships, and feigned piety is 
presented with all its harshness.75  
Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now shares certain 
features with The Deer Hunter, especially concerning the 
emotional impact of war. Nevertheless, it also sets a major 
focus on the military aspect of this war. Based on Joseph 
Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness, it remained as one of the most 
significant movies on the Vietnam War. The picture painted 
prods to an ambiguity which runs through the movie like a 
common thread. “For instance, the title, Apocalypse Now, 
seems to emphasize the destructive, prowar side of the film, 
derived as it was from the antiwar slogan ‘Peace Now!’ Yet it 
is also possible that the title is an ironic warning of the 
ultimate dangers of extended conflict.”76 The movie lives of 
exaggeration, violence, and insanity, but at the same time it 
portrays mental illness, weakness, and fear. Through this 
ambiguous depiction, one constantly wonders about the 
message the film conveys, and whether it is pro- or anti-war. 
The opening sequence sets the tone for this movie: Napalm 
bombs are dropping on the Vietnamese jungle while the 
Doors’ song “The End” is playing. The picture changes and 
shows Cpt. Benjamin L. Willard (Martin Sheen) in his hotel 
room in Saigon reflecting upon the damages the war had on 
his life: 
Saigon. Shit. I’m still only in Saigon. Every time, I think I’m 
going to wake up back in the jungle. When I was home after 
my first tour, it was worse. I’d wake up, and there’d be 
nothing. I hardly said a word to my wife, until I said yes to a 
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divorce. When I was here, I wanted to be there. When I was 
there, all I could think of was getting back into the jungle. 
I’m here a week now … waiting for a mission, getting 
softer. Every minute I stay in this room, I get weaker.77 
As soldiers pick him up for the mission he is waiting for 
they find him disoriented, drunk, and covered in blood, 
just a hint of the insanity to expect. Willard is sent on a 
mission to terminate Walter E. Kurtz (Marlon Brando), a 
highly decorated Colonel, who apparently lost track of his 
command and is about to be arrested for murder. While 
following the Captain on his operation, Coppola leads the 
audience deeper into the jungle and the horror of Vietnam. 
As Willard begins his trip, he receives help from the U.S. 
navy and the air cavalry. Thus, the immense firepower of 
the U.S. military is portrayed with helicopters, tanks, boats, 
and ocean tanks; there is nothing the superpower does not 
have. Coppola even criticizes the media itself by showing a 
camera team78 which tells the soldiers “keep moving don’t 
look at the camera. Just go by like you’re fighting. It’s for 
television. Just go through,” and thereby showing that the 
media  representatives are trying to provide impressive 
pictures. 79  Seizing on the common theme, Bill Kilgore 
(Robert Duvall) is introduced, a Lieutenant Colonel who 
helps to bring Willard downriver. He is leading the 1st 
Cavalry Division and is the perfect example for both 
intrepidity and madness. For instance, he throws play cards 
with the company emblem on the dead Vietnamese bodies. 
On asking what he is doing, the Lieutenant answers: 
“Death cards. Lets Charlie know who did this.”80 Although 
he clearly opposes himself to the enemy by this action he 
also shows appreciation of their will to combat: “Any man 
                                               
77 Francis Ford Coppola, Apocalypse Now. Film. Directed by Francis Ford 
Coppola. Beverly Hills: United Artists, 1979.  
78 Coppola himself has a cameo appearance, playing the correspondent 
who instructs the soldiers. 
79 Apocalypse Now, 1979. 
80 Ibid. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:19:15 |
70 
 
brave enough to fight with his guts hanging out can drink 
from my canteen any day.”81 The absurdity of the situation 
is enhanced when Kilgore spotted that one member of the 
boat crew, who brought Willard to the Lieutenant, is a 
famous surfer. Consequently, he decides to clear a beach 
located in Charlie territory to surf there. To greet their 
opponent appropriately they launch a psywar operation by 
blasting Wagner’s Valkyrie out of the helicopter’s 
loudspeaker system. On arrival, the situation is not as easily 
manageable as Kilgore presented it and even though they 
were peppered by the VC he insists on surfing there. This 
clearly shows war fever at its best and the blunted effect 
the war has on the soldiers there. Underlined by Kilgore’s 
statement “Do you smell that? … Napalm, son. Nothing 
else in the world smells like that. I love the smell of napalm 
in the morning.” 82  After escaping from the preliminary 
stage of the apocalypse, their trip leads them to the Do 
Lung Bridge where a new level of anarchy is illustrated.83 
Nobody knows who is in command, the soldiers swim 
towards the boat hoping they can go home, and rock music 
sounds through the trenches. It seems as if the crew 
reached the precursor of the hell they still have to expect. 
Therefore, the movie reaches its climax when Willard and 
the few members left of his crew find Kurtz. They are 
greeted by a benighted photojournalist (Dennis Hopper), 
who seems to have fallen under Kurtz’s spell, just like the 
Russian in the Heart of Darkness. Heads on pikes, bodies 
hanging from the trees, and obsequious natives introduce 
the audience to Kurtz’s “kingdom.” He himself carries an 
ambiguity: On the one hand he is representative for the 
ultimate madness produced by the war; on the other hand 
Kurtz is seemingly the only one who figured it all out. Just 
as the photojournalist states: “The man is clear in his mind, 
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but his soul is mad.”84 The movie ends with The Door’s 
song “The End,” just like it has started, and seeing Willard 
who fulfills his mission by slaughtering Kurtz with a 
machete, hearing the word “the horror” echoing until it 
fades out.  
 Ultimately, what message does Coppola’s 
masterpiece convey and what position does it take? The 
director explains: 
The story is metaphorical: Willard’s Journey up the river is 
also a journey into himself, and the strange and savage men 
he finds at the end is also an aspect of himself. Clearly, 
although the film is certainly ‘anti-war,’ its focus is not on 
recent politics. The intention is to make a film that is of 
much broader scope: and provide the audience with an 
exhilarated [sic!] journey into the nature of men, and his 
relationship to the Creation. It is the hope of the film-
makers to tell his story using the unique imagery of the 
recent Vietnamese War; its helicopters, disposable 
weaponry; as well as the Rock music, the drugs and 
psychedelic sensibilities.85 
Hence, Coppola answers the question and states that 
Apocalypse Now is meant to be anti-war. However, 
whether or not the perception of this movie points 
towards the same conclusion is a matter of 
interpretation. Furthermore, he disassociates himself 
from the political background of the war and, just as The 
Deer Hunter, uses Vietnam as expedient. Regardless of 
this usage, the question has to be raised if it is possible 
to produce a war movie without considering its political 
aspects as well. 
After creating The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now, Hollywood 
returns to its conservative form, by presenting the veteran in a 
less complex way and consequently a more simple depiction 
of the war. The years between the release of the movies 
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mentioned and Stone’s and Kubrick’s works were traversed by 
films like Rambo (1982) and “prisoner-of-war adventure 
film[s],” until Platoon launched in 1986.86 
 The distinctiveness of Platoon is definitely the realistic 
depiction of the war, clearly a consequence of the time Stone 
served in the Vietnam War for the Army.87 Right from the 
beginning on, the movie presents a highly critical view of the 
war, in contrast to the movies discussed earlier, there is no 
doubt that Platoon is an anti-war movie. The first scene is 
crucial for the impression prevailed throughout the whole 
film. The newcomers arrive in Vietnam where they are 
“welcomed” by tired, exhausted, and desperate soldiers who 
are sent home after their one year tour in Vietnam and 
quantities of body bags lined up. The audience follows Chris 
(Charlie Sheen), after he was assigned to his platoon into the 
Vietnamese jungle where he finds himself in his own personal 
hell. Not only is the constant Vietcong threat depicted, but 
also the dire conditions in Vietnam. There are dangerous 
animals, insects, mud, tropical rain and heat. On top of this, 
nobody in the platoon cares to integrate the newcomers, an 
indifference that can be fatal. Chris states: “It’s scary cos 
nobody tells me how to do anything, cos I’m new. Nobody 
cares about new guys. They don’t even wanna know your 
name. A new guy’s life isn’t worth as much cos he hasn’t put 
his time in yet.”88 The movie combines many aspects of the 
war’s reality, which are not incorporated as intensively in the 
two earlier movies. One would be the consumption of drugs 
although they are in combat situation; it seems as if the 
soldiers could not handle the war without them. Concerning 
the military structure, the criticism on the newcomer situation 
has already been given, however, Stone also criticizes the 
                                               
86 Stewart O’Nan, “Second Wave of Major Films,” In The Vietnam Reader: 
The Definitive Collection of American Fiction and Nonfiction on the War, ed. 
Stewart O’Nan (New York: Anchor Books, 1998), 441. 
87 Ibid., 443. 
88 Arnold Kopelson, Platoon. Film. Directed by Oliver Stone. Los Angeles. 
Orion Pictures, 1986. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:19:15 |
73 
 
inconsistency of the chain of command. Lt. Wolfe (Mark 
Moses) who officially leads the platoon, which Chris is 
assigned to, is preempted by Sgt. Barnes (Tom Berenger) and 
Sgt. Elias (Willem Dafoe) whose orders are actually obeyed. 
This causes a condition which aggravates into a rivalry 
between these two leaders as they have different attitudes on 
proceeding with their mission. Especially striking about 
Stone’s work is that the war crimes committed by Americans 
play a vital role in his depiction of the Vietnam War. He does 
not sugarcoat anything in his film but presents the madness 
and horror of the war like many soldiers have experienced it. 
Watching the village massacre scene, inevitably pictures of the 
My Lai Massacre cross one’s mind, and they clearly show the 
prevalent escalation. A proliferation takes place once it 
doesn’t matter anymore who is a Vietcong and who is a 
civilian, consequently violence gets out of hand when Bunny 
(Kevin Dillon) shouts out: “Holy Shit, you’ve seen that 
fucking head come apart? … Let’s do the whole fucking 
village!”89 Once again there is an uncertainty about who is in 
command, since the lieutenant just observes the situation but 
doesn’t interrupt Sgt. Barnes who even threatens to kill a little 
girl. Stone does not strive to create a heroic protagonist, but 
rather describes the soldiers’ attempt to survive and cope with 
the situation. 90  Moreover, he tries to convey a message 
throughout the whole movie: “In the end, good wins out over 
evil.” Chris and his stoner buddies survive, Barnes is dead and 
his copycat O’Neill (John C. McGinley) remains in the jungle, 
leading a second platoon.91 Chris’ monologue flying out of the 
battle zone underlines this idea:  
I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy; we 
fought ourselves, and the enemy was in us. The war is over 
for me now, but it will always be there the rest of my days, 
as I’m sure Elias will be, fighting with Barnes for what Rhah 
called the possession of my soul. There are times I’ve felt 
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like a child born of those two fathers. But be that as it may, 
those of us, who did make it have an obligation to build 
again, to teach to others what we know, and to try with 
what’s left of our lives to find a goodness, and meaning, to 
this life.92 
Oliver Stone’s Platoon differs from Apocalypse Now, The Deer 
Hunter and Full Metal Jacket, because there is no ambiguity, 
the good remain good and the evil remain evil. 
Furthermore, with Chris’s last statement the director 
conveys his criticism of the Vietnam War. He does not 
consider the war pointless, but vital to America’s past.93 
Stone argues that the war will always be present in 
American hearts and minds, particularly for the veterans. 
The last part directly concerns those who survived the war 
and, thus, urges the Vietnam War veterans to “try with 
what’s left of [their] lives to find goodness, and meaning to 
this life”.94 
 To complete Hollywood’s depiction of the 
Vietnam War, Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket will be 
analyzed. Although, it was issued just a year after Stone’s 
Platoon, it imparts new aspects of the Hollywood war 
movie. The particularity is that in contrast to the other 
movies there is a bipartite structure, which shows the 
journey of a group who meets at basic training and reunites 
in Vietnam. The first section which evolves around the 
basic training of these young recruits critically implies the 
importance of the U.S. war machinery.95 The recruits have 
to be assimilated to form one unit; personal peculiarities 
and weakness have no place in the military. They are taken 
out of their normal lives, receive new names, and have to 
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comply with the drill instructor Gunnery Sergeant 
Hartman’s (R. Lee Ermy) measures. Consequently, 
everyone who protrudes, such as Private Leonard ‘Gomer 
Pyle’ Lawrence (Vincent D’Onforio), has to be 
homogenized to fit the community. Private J.T. ‘Joker’ 
Davis (Matthew Modine) is instructed to help Pyle to do 
better in his training, but even Joker cannot accept that he 
is constantly getting the group in trouble. Therefore, the 
other privates exact their revenge on Pyle with a blanket 
party.96 However, through the constant animosity by the 
other privates and the drill sergeant he seems to be 
slipping, a process culminating in his suicide and the 
murder of the drill instructor the night he found out he 
successfully finished basic training. In the second section 
of the movie, the concept of the perfect American soldier 
generated by the unsympathetic drill sergeant is dismantled 
starting with a drastic change of setting, when we see Joker 
who’s working as a combat correspondent for the Stars and 
Stripes magazine in Saigon.97 Hence, Kubrick does not only 
offer his impression of the Vietnam War, but also his 
opinion on the media coverage of this conflict. For 
instance the meeting of the Stars and Stripes correspondents 
comprises many different aspects. When Joker points out 
that there might happen something during the Tet 
ceasefire, which clearly hints at the failure of American 
intelligence service to predict the Tet Offensive. 
Furthermore, Kubrick addresses censorship and 
terminology by integrating a directive which states that 
“search and destroy” should now be replaced with “sweep 
and clear” to make it more catchy.98 Moreover, Joker’s last 
story was not fascinating enough and he is told to rewrite 
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it: “Winning of hearts and minds. … That’s why God 
passed the law of probability. Rewrite it with a happy 
ending, say, one kill. A sapper or an officer … Grunts99 like 
reading about dead officers.” On Joker’s question why not 
a general Lt. Lockhart (John Terry) responds he gets the 
following response: “You’d like your guys to read the 
paper and feel bad? In case you didn’t know, this is not a 
popular war. Our job is to report the news that the ‘why-
are-we-here’ civilian newsman ignore.” Kubrick’s attitude 
towards both the military and civilian media coverage is 
obvious and once more enhanced by the label of the 
banner on the wall of the newsroom: “First to go, last to 
know – we will defend to death our right to be 
misinformed”.100 In the following, Jokers prediction of the 
Tet Offensive proves to be true, therefore, he is sent to 
report from a military point of view, to reverse the public 
opinion on the Vietcong’s attack. On his arrival, the 
audience observes the effect of the offensive, mass graves, 
an enormous body count, and plenty of reporters and 
photographers on-site. Joker is sent to Phu Bai, where he 
retrieves his comrade ‘Cowboy,’ Sgt. Robert Evans (Arliss 
Howard) from basic training. Having portrayed the war 
from a distance, by following Joker’s journey, the audience 
now is confronted with the sad and shocking reality of war.  
Once again, the media criticism becomes apparent 
when Cowboy introduces Joker to his squad: “This is my 
bro, Joker, from the island. They’re from Stars and Stripes. 
You’ll be famous,” topped with one of the soldiers posing 
for a picture next to a dead Vietnamese.101 Pursuing this 
image TV interviews are held, in order for the soldiers to 
present their opinion on the war and the need of the 
American intervention. The soldiers are treated like TV 
stars and the fact that one member of their squad just died 
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seems to be irrelevant. As the group moves on through 
Hué, they have to suffer from many casualties as they are 
attacked by a sniper. As the Lusthog squad also loses 
Cowboy, they start a counter attack to terminate their 
enemy, who turns out to be a little girl. While the rest of 
the squad hesitates on how to proceed, Joker decides to 
end her suffering. The film ends with the troop heading 
out on patrol, while singing the Mickey Mouse theme, and 
Joker’s voice over stating: “I am so happy that I am alive 
… in one piece, and short. I’m in a world of shit, yes. But I 
am alive. And I am not afraid.”102 
Full Metal Jacket conveys a criticism on the war, the 
military, and the media coverage of the Vietnam War. Just 
like The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now, it plays with a 
constant ambiguity, which is embodied by Joker, the war 
correspondent who wears a piece sign on his uniform and 
has “born to kill” written on his helmet. Moreover, 
“[w]here Platoon affirms the old romantic idea of war as a 
crucible that builds men, Kubrick seems to be saying – 
through Pyle and then Joker and the men of the Lusthog 
squad – that Vietnam, or simply the war, takes these boys 
not from innocence to experience but to numbness or 
madness.”103 Furthermore, there is to mention that since 
Full Metal Jacket was released 12 years after the war has 
ended, one would expect an incorporation of the antiwar 
movement, which is neglected in this movie, plainly 
through its absence.104  
The Vietnam War movie, no matter in which facet 
it appears, fulfills an important function for the American 
society. It was both a way of historical revision and a way 
to close with the past. Consequently, by using film as a 
medium a definatory power is retrieved over a war, which 
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could not be won and was lost after all.105 The four movies 
presented seemingly differ from this impression, since they 
involve several themes close to reality. Those movies are 
intended to play with exaggeration, overstatement and 
ambiguity, to address their criticism and to leave room for 
interpretation and discussion. 
 
Conclusion 
Resuming, what is the role of the media in the Vietnam War? 
Clearly, the opinions on this question are diverted, however, 
the overall consensus comprises that, although the media had 
an influence on the public opinion of the Americans and the 
people worldwide, it cannot be blamed for ending the 
Vietnam War. The surrender of the Americans in Vietnam 
was affected by many factors on top of the media coverage, 
such as the lack of knowledge of the Vietcong’s guerilla 
techniques, the landscape, and the culture. 
Furthermore, the North Vietnamese did not win the 
war being superior fighters, but being more motivated. The 
Vietnam War was a prime example that one must be 
convinced of the cause – it must be worth fighting for. This 
motivation and thereby the public support of the involvement 
in Vietnam could not be upheld after events, such as the Tet 
Offensive or the massacre of My Lai. It is needless to say that 
after all through the media coverage, and the new medium 
TV, these pictures found their way into the living rooms 
worldwide. However, even the TV coverage mostly remained 
too mellow to achieve a drastic change of opinion. In addition 
to that, the broadcasted reports initially distorted the image of 
the war, by presenting only little combat actions and by 
depicting the American GIs rather as Hollywood actors than 
soldier. The perception of the war through the TV reports, in 
fact covered the interests of the politicians to portray the war 
in a cautious manner.106  
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Nevertheless, the role of the media is both exceptional and 
unique as depicted by Jacqueline Phinney, who states that 
“[t]he Vietnam War was a turning point in the management of 
war reports” and that “media has the power to move 
people.”107 It appears that at the end of the Vietnam War a 
scapegoat had to be found to explain and justify the defeat the 
U.S. suffered from, as it is the first war in American history 
that was lost live on TV. “Whether thought of as savior or 
villain, the press has enjoyed a virtually unanimous reputation 
as a powerful actor whose adversarial relationship to the 
United States government and military played a large part in 
ending American involvement in the war.”108 
Looking at the way the movies that were scrutinized 
depicted the Vietnam War, a similar picture is painted. The 
perception of the conflict in Indochina in the movies is 
equally diverse than on the role of the media during the 
Vietnam War. However, it was generally agreed that the 
conflict exceeded most previous wars in the cruelty, the 
futility, and the amount of casualties. Although, every movie 
depicts the horror of Vietnam differently, their overall 
objective seems to be to come to terms with the loss of the 
Vietnam War and to erode the blemish it left in its wake. 
Finally, the saying that “there was more of it in 
Vietnam” proved to be true and led to a new assessment on 
the handling of the war reporting in the future. Consequently, 
the new mantra of the American information and foreign 
policy emerged to be: “No more Vietnams,”109 to prevent a 
repetition of America’s nightmare. 
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